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Abstract We show how codatatypes can be employed to produce compact, high-level proofs
of key results in logic: the soundness and completeness of proof systems for variations of
first-order logic. For the classical completeness result, we first establish an abstract prop-
erty of possibly infinite derivation trees. The abstract proof can be instantiated for a wide
range of Gentzen and tableau systems for various flavors of first-order logic. Soundness be-
comes interesting as soon as one allows infinite proofs of first-order formulas. This forms the
subject of several cyclic proof systems for first-order logic augmented with inductive pred-
icate definitions studied in the literature. All the discussed results are formalized using Isa-
belle/HOL’s recently introduced support for codatatypes and corecursion. The development
illustrates some unique features of Isabelle/HOL’s new coinductive specification language
such as nesting through non-free types and mixed recursion–corecursion.
1 Introduction
Gödel’s completeness theorem [23] is a major result about first-order logic (FOL). It forms
the basis of results and techniques in various areas, including mathematical logic, automated
deduction, and program verification. It can be stated as follows: If a set of formulas is satis-
fied by all structures, then it has a proof. The theorem enjoys many accounts in the literature
that generalize and simplify the original proof; indeed, a textbook on mathematical logic
would be incomplete without a proof of this fundamental theorem.
Formal logic has always been a battleground between semantic and syntactic methods.
Generally speaking, mathematicians belong to the semantic school, whereas computer scien-
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tists tend to take the other side of the argument. The completeness theorem, which combines
syntax and semantics, is also disputed, with the result that each school has its own proof. In
his review of Gallier’s Logic for Computer Science [22], Pfenning, a fellow “syntactician,”
notes the following [41]:
All too often, proof-theoretic methods are neglected in favor of shorter, and super-
ficially more elegant semantic arguments. [In contrast, in Gallier’s book] the treat-
ment of the proof theory of the Gentzen system is oriented towards computation
with proofs. For example, a pseudo-Pascal version of a complete search procedure
for first-order cut-free Gentzen proofs is presented.
In the context of completeness, the “superficially more elegant semantic arguments” are
proofs that rely on Hilbert systems. These systems have several axioms but only one or two
deduction rules, providing minimal support for presenting the structure of proofs or for mod-
eling proof search. A proof of completeness based on Hilbert systems follows the Henkin
style: It employs a heavy bureaucratic apparatus to establish facts about deduction and con-
servative language extensions, culminating in a highly nonconstructive step: an application
of Zorn’s lemma to extend any syntactically consistent set of formulas to a maximally con-
sistent one, from which a model is produced.
In contrast, a proof of completeness based on more elaborate Gentzen or tableau systems
follows the Beth–Hintikka style [31]. It performs a search that builds either a finite deduction
tree yielding a proof (or refutation, depending on the system) or an infinite tree from which
a countermodel (or model) can be extracted. Such completeness proofs have an intuitive
content that stresses the tension of the argument: The deduction system systematically tries
to prove the goal; a failure yields, at the limit, a countermodel.
The intuitive appeal of the Beth–Hintikka approach comes at a price: It requires rea-
soning about infinite derivation trees and infinite paths. Unfortunately, convenient means to
reason about infinite (or lazy) data structures are lacking in mainstream mathematics. For ex-
ample, an otherwise extremely rigorous textbook such as Bell and Machover’s [1] becomes
surprisingly informal when defining and using possibly infinite refutation tableau trees:
A tableau is a set of elements, called nodes, partially ordered and classified into
levels as explained below. With each node is associated a finite set of formulas.
We shall usually identify a given node with its associated set of formulas; this is
somewhat imprecise (since in fact the same set of formulas can be associated with
different nodes) but will not cause confusion.
Each node belongs to a unique level, which is labeled by some natural number.
There is just one node of level 0, called the initial node of the tableau. Each node at
level n+1 is a successor of a unique node, which must be of level n.
In textbooks, at best the trees are defined rigorously (e.g., as prefix-closed sets), but the
reasoning is performed informally, disregarding the original definition and relying on the
intuitive notion of trees, as Gallier does. One could argue that trees are intuitive and do not
need a formal treatment, but the same holds for the syntax of formulas, which is treated very
rigorously in most of the textbooks.
The main contribution of this article is a rigorous Beth–Hintikka-style proof of the com-
pleteness theorem, based on a Gentzen system. The potentially infinite trees are captured
by codatatypes (also called coinductive datatypes or final coalgebras) [29]. Another novel
aspect of the proof is its modularity: The core tree construction argument is isolated from
the proof system and concrete formula syntax, with the concrete syntactic details concealed
behind an abstract Herbrandness assumption (Section 3). This assumption can be verified
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in concrete cases (by performing the standard Herbrand model construction) for a wide
range of Gentzen and tableau systems for FOL, various flavors of FOL (e.g., with or without
predicates, equality, or sorts), and even modal logics with explicit-world Gentzen systems
(Section 4). This modularization replaces the textbook proofs by analogy. The core of the
argument amounts to reasoning about a functional program over lazy data structures.
A second contribution of this article is an application of the same coinductive machin-
ery (infinite trees and streams and corecursive functions between them) to some interesting
recent results from the automated deduction literature: the soundness of infinite (including
cyclic) proofs for FOL with inductive definitions and related logics, studied by Brotherston
et al. [12–16]. For formalizing these results, we follow rather closely the abstract construc-
tions of Brotherston et al. [16], except that we use coinduction and corecursion to streamline
the development. The presentation follows the same path as for completeness: The main re-
sult is stated abstractly (Section 5) and instantiated by concrete examples (Section 6).
The proofs of the abstract results are formalized in Isabelle/HOL (Section 7). The defi-
nitions of infinite trees and paths rely on a new definitional package for codatatypes [6, 11],
which automates the derivation of characteristic theorems from high-level specifications of
types and functions. Through Isabelle’s code generator [25], the corecursive construction
gives rise to a Haskell program that implements a semidecision procedure for validity in-
stantiable with various proof systems, yielding verified sound and complete provers.
The completeness proof has been applied to the formalization of optimized translations
between sorted and unsorted FOL [4, 7]. The soundness proofs of these translations rest
on the Löwenheim–Skolem theorem, a corollary of a slightly generalized version of the
completeness theorem. The previous formal proofs of the completeness theorem, including
two in Isabelle, support a more restrictive logic than many-sorted FOL (Section 8).
An earlier version of this article was presented at the IJCAR 2014 conference in Vi-
enna, Austria, under a different title [9]. The article considerably extends the conference
paper with infinite-proof soundness (Sections 5 and 6) as a second application of coin-
ductive methods. It also provides more details about the Beth–Hintikka-style proof of the
completeness theorem (Sections 3 and 4).
Conventions. Isabelle/HOL [39] is a proof assistant based on classical higher-order logic
(HOL) with Hilbert choice, the axiom of infinity, and rank-1 polymorphism. It is the logic of
Gordon’s original HOL system [24] and of its many successors. HOL notations are similar to
those of functional programming languages, but they also include many traditional symbols
and syntaxes from mathematics, notably to denote simply typed sets. We refer to Nipkow
and Klein [38, Part 1] for a modern introduction. In this article, the logic is viewed not as a
formal system but rather as a framework for expressing mathematics, much like set theory
is employed by working mathematicians. In keeping with the standard semantics of HOL,
types α are identified with sets.
2 Preliminaries on First-Order Logic
The soundness and completeness results we formalize in this article apply to an array of
variations of first-order logic and beyond (modal logics, separation logic, etc.). To give some
concrete grounding for the forthcoming abstract development, we recall basic (unsorted)
first-order logic and its extension with inductive predicates.
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2.1 Classical First-Order Logic
We fix a first-order language: a countably infinite set var of variables x, y, z and countable
sets fsym and psym of function symbols f and predicate symbols p together with an assign-
ment ar : fsym unionmulti psym→ nat of numeric arities. Terms t ∈ term are symbolic expressions
built inductively from variables by application of function symbols f ∈ fsym to tuples of
arguments whose lengths respect the arities: f (t1, . . . , tar f ). Atoms a ∈ atom are symbolic
expressions of the form p(t1, . . . , tar p), where p ∈ psym and t1, . . . , tar p ∈ term.
Formulas ϕ, ψmay be atoms, negations, conjunctions, or universal quantifications. They
are defined as follows:
datatype fmla = Atm atom
| Neg fmla
| Conj fmla fmla
| All var fmla
As usual, we define the (syntactic) implication of two formulas ϕ1, ϕ2 by Imp ϕ1 ϕ2 =
Neg (Conj ϕ1 (Neg ϕ2)).
To distinguish between the first-order language of study and the HOL metalanguage, we
use the constructor names Neg, Conj, and All for the former, keeping the traditional symbols
¬, ∧, and ∀ for the latter. We often write a instead of Atm a, thus pretending that atoms are
included in formulas.
A structureS =
(
S, (Ff ) f ∈ fsym, (Pp)p∈psym
)
for the given language consists of a car-
rier set S, together with a function Ff : Sn → S for each n-ary f ∈ fsym and a predicate
Pp : Sn→ bool for each n-ary p ∈ psym. The notions of interpretation of a term t and satis-
faction of a formula ϕ by a structure S with respect to a variable valuation ξ : var→ S are
defined in the standard way. For terms (by structural recursion):
JxKSξ = ξ x J f (t1, . . . , tn)KSξ = Ff (Jt1KSξ , . . . , JtnKSξ )
For atoms:
S |=ξ p(t1, . . . , tn) iff Pp
(Jt1KSξ , . . . , JtnKSξ )
For formulas (by structural recursion):
S |=ξ Atm a iff S |=ξ a S |=ξ Conj ϕ ψ iff S |=ξ ϕ ∧ S |=ξ ψ
S |=ξ Neg ϕ iff S 6|=ξ ϕ S |=ξ All x ϕ iff ∀a∈S. S |=ξ[x←a] ϕ
Above, ξ[x← a] denotes the valuation that sends x to a and all other variables y to ξ y.
We define the notion of a structure S satisfying a formula ϕ, written S |= ϕ, to mean
satisfaction with respect to all valuations: ∀ξ.S |=ξ ϕ.
A sequent is a pair ΓB ∆ of finite sets of formulas. Satisfaction is extended to sequents:
S |= Γ B ∆ iff (∀ϕ∈ Γ. S |= ϕ) ⇒ (∃ψ∈ ∆. S |= ψ). We can think of Γ B ∆ as an
implication between the conjunction of the formulas of Γ and the disjunction of the formulas
of ∆. If S |= ΓB ∆, we also call S a model of ΓB ∆. By contrast, if S 6|= ΓB ∆, we call
S a countermodel of ΓB ∆
A standard proof system on sequents is defined inductively as follows, where the nota-
tion Γ, ϕ abbreviates the set Γ∪{ϕ}:
AX
Γ, Atm a B ∆, Atm a
Γ B ∆, ϕ
NEGL
Γ, Neg ϕ B ∆
Γ, ϕ B ∆
NEGR
Γ B ∆, Neg ϕ
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Γ, ϕ, ψ B ∆
CONJL
Γ, Conj ϕ ψ B ∆
Γ B ∆, ϕ Γ B ∆, ψ
CONJR
Γ B ∆, Conj ϕ ψ
Γ, All x ϕ, ϕ[t/x] B ∆
ALLL
Γ, All x ϕ B ∆
Γ B ∆, ϕ[y/x] ALLR
(y fresh)Γ B ∆, All x ϕ
Since here sequents are sets, we do not need the structural rules (weakening, contraction,
and exchange).
In a proof, the rules are applied from bottom to top. One chooses a formula from either
side of the sequent, the eigenformula, and applies a rule according to the topmost connective
or quantifier. For a given choice of eigenformula, at most one rule is applicable. The aim of
applying the rules is to prove the sequent by building a finite derivation tree whose branches
are closed by an axiom (AX). Provability of a sequent in this system is denoted by prefixing
` to the sequent (e.g., ` ΓB ∆).
The soundness theorem states that any provable sequent is satisfied by all structures:
` ΓB ∆ ⇒ (∀S .S |= ΓB ∆)
The completeness theorem states the converse—namely, any sequent that is satisfied by all
structures is provable:
(∀S .S |= ΓB ∆) ⇒ ` ΓB ∆
Section 3 presents abstract versions of these classic soundness and completeness theorems.
2.2 First-Order Logic with Inductive Predicates
Another logic we consider is first-order logic with inductive predicates (FOLind). In addition
to the first-order language given by var, fsym, psym, and ar : fsym unionmulti psym→ nat, we fix a
subset of predicate symbols ipsym⊆ psym which are called inductive. Moreover, we fix, for
each p ∈ ipsym, a set indp of Horn clauses specifying p, so that each element of indp is of
the form Imp (Conj ψ1 . . . ψm ϕ1 . . . ϕn) ϕ, where
– Conj denotes the conjunction of multiple formulas;1
– ϕ is an atom of the form p(t1, . . . , tar p);
– each ϕi is an atom of the form p′(t1, . . . , tar p′) for some p′ ∈ ipsym;
– each ψ j is a formula not containing any p′ ∈ ipsym.
The above set of restrictions is aimed to ensure monotonicity of the Horn clauses interpreted
as inductive definitions. To simplify the exposition, we choose a rather strong restriction, but
more flexible ones are possible [12].
A first-order structure S =
(
S, (Ff ) f ∈ fsym, (Pp)p∈psym
)
is said to be inductive (with
respect to ipsym and (indp)p∈ipsym) if the interpretation of each p ∈ ipsym is indeed in-
ductive, i.e., the family (Pp)p∈ ipsym constitutes the least fixpoint of all the inductive Horn
clauses interpreted in S , meaning that (Pp)p∈ipsym is the least family of predicates (with
respect to component-wise implication) such thatS |= χ for all χ ∈⋃p∈psym indp.
Example 1 Assume fsym= {0, Suc}, ipsym= psym= {even, odd}, and
– indeven consists of the following clauses:
1 Given formulas ψ1, . . . , ψk , we let Conj ψ1 . . . ψk denote Conj ψ1 (Conj ψ2 (. . . ψn) . . .). In particular,
when k = 0 it denotes the “true” formula >, defined in a standard way, e.g., as Imp a a for some atom a.
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– even(0);
– Imp (even(x)) (even(Suc(Suc(x))));
– indodd consists of the following clauses:
– odd(Suc(0));
– Imp (odd(x)) (odd(Suc(Suc(x)))).
A structure S =
(
S, (F0, FSuc), (Peven, Podd)
)
for this language is inductive iff, for fixed(
S, (F0, FSuc)), Peven and Podd is the least (i.e., strongest) pair of unary predicates on S
such that
– Peven(F0);
– ∀n ∈ S . Peven(n)⇒ Peven(FSuc(FSuc(n)));
– Podd(FSuc(F0));
– ∀n ∈ S . Podd(n)⇒ Podd(FSuc(FSuc(n))).
In particular, if
(
S, (F0, FSuc)) is the standard set of natural numbers with zero and succes-
sor, then Peven and Podd must be the standard parity predicates.
Obviously, there are more admissible rules for inductive structures than for arbitrary
structures. The following rules are admissible for even, where Γ[t/x] denotes the (capture-
avoiding) substitution of the term t for the variable x in all formulas of Γ:
EVEN0
Γ B ∆, even(0)
Γ B ∆, even(x)
EVENSuc
Γ B ∆, even(Suc(Suc(x)))
Γ[0/x] B ∆[0/x] Γ[Suc(Suc(y))/x], even(y) B ∆[Suc(Suc(y))/x] EVENsplit
(y fresh)Γ, even(x) B ∆
The direct rules EVEN0 and EVENSuc (corresponding to the two cases in the inductive spec-
ification of even) are admissible since all inductive structures satisfy the Horn clauses for
even. Moreover, the inversion rule EVENsplit is admissible by the least fixpoint assumption—
the rule expresses that, if even(x) is known, then it must have been obtained by an application
of one of the inductive clauses for even. Similar rules hold for odd:
ODD0
Γ B ∆, odd(Suc(0))
Γ B ∆, odd(x)
ODDSuc
Γ B ∆, odd(Suc(Suc(x)))
Γ[Suc(0)/x] B ∆[Suc(0)/x] Γ[Suc(Suc(y))/x], odd(y) B ∆[Suc(Suc(y))/x] ODDsplit
(y fresh)Γ, odd(x) B ∆
In general, for all inductive predicates p ∈ ipsym, the following rules are sound:
(Γ B ∆, ϕ)ϕ ∈prems(χ) pχ
Γ B ∆, concl(χ)
(Γ[t/x], prems(χ′) B ∆[t/x])χ∈indp psplit
Γ, p(x) B ∆
There is one pχ rule for each p ∈ ipsym and χ ∈ indp, with prems(χ) denoting the premises
of χ and concl(χ) its conclusion. In addition, there is one psplit rule for each p ∈ ipsym such
that
– χ′ is a variant of χ where all the free variables are fresh for Γ ∪ ∆;
– p(t) is concl(χ′)—with t thus being a tuple of terms (t1, . . . , tar p);
– x is a tuple of distinct variables (x1, . . . , xar p).
The Gentzen system for FOLind consists of the FOL rules from Section 2.1 extended
with the above rules pχ, psplit and the following substitution rule:
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Γ B ∆
SUBSTt,x
Γ[t/x] B ∆[t/x]
This rule is designed to complement the direct rule pχ, for the purpose of applying the Horn
clauses of p to particular instances.
The inversion rule psplit is not as powerful as it could be, due to the restriction that the
eigenformula, p(x), must be a predicate symbol applied to variables. In a FOLind variant
with equality, this could be strengthened to speak about arbitrary terms instead of variables
[13, Section 4.1].
Beyond the additional admissible rules, a crucial insight of Brotherston [12] is that, for
inductive structures, a certain type of proof circularity is permissible. It allows the proof trees
to have as leaf nodes not only axioms, but also backward links to other sequents in the tree.
This insight is useful for automating induction [12]. Brotherston et al. [16] give an abstract,
logic-independent argument for why allowing such circularities is sound. In Section 5, we
show that this argument can be naturally formalized using a coinductive machinery similar
to the one we use for classic completeness.
3 Abstract Soundness and Completeness
Before studying applications, we first develop an abstract framework that allows us to state
and prove soundness and completeness for an unspecified syntax and class of structures and
satisfaction relation. The framework is obtained by distilling the corresponding concrete
results for FOL.
For soundness, we simply assume the rules to be locally sound for the models, which
immediately yields global soundness. Completeness is more elaborate. The proof is divided
in two parts. The first part, captured in this section, focuses on the core of the completeness
argument in an abstract, syntax-free manner. This level captures the tension between the
existence of a proof and of a countermodel-producing path, introduced through what we call
an escape path—an infinite sequence of rule applications that “escapes” the proof attempt.
The tension is distilled in the following result:
Either there exists a finite derivation tree or there exists an infinite derivation tree
containing a suitable escape path.
The second part maps the escape path to a concrete, proof-system-specific countermodel
employing a construction due to Herbrand. At the abstract level, we assume a “Herbrand
function” that produces countermodels from escape paths. In Section 4, we instantiate this
function for the Gentzen system introduced in Section 2.1.
3.1 Sequents and Structures
We abstract away from the syntax of formulas and sequents and the specific rules of the
proof system. We fix countable sets sequent and rule for sequents and rules. Our abstract
sequents represent the formal statements in the logic, which can take either the form of
concrete sequents or other forms.
Moreover, we abstract away from the concrete form of structures, assuming a fixed class
structure and a satisfaction relation
|= : structure→ sequent→ bool
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where S |= s indicates that S satisfies (is a model of) s. We write |= s to indicate that s is
satisfied by all models in structure: ∀S∈ structure. S |= s.
3.2 Rule Systems
We assume that the meaning of the rules is given by an effect relation
eﬀ : rule→ sequent→ sequent fset→ bool
where α fset denotes the set of finite subsets of α. The reading of eﬀ r s ss is as follows:
Starting from sequent s, applying rule r expands s into the sequents ss. We can think of
sequents as proof goals, each goal being replaced by zero or more subgoals by applying a
rule. The tripleR = (sequent, rule, eﬀ) forms a rule system.
Example 2 The Gentzen system from Section 2.1 can be presented as a rule system. The
set sequent is the set of sequents, and rule consists of the following: a rule AXa for each
atom a; rules NEGLϕ and NEGRϕ for each formula ϕ; rules CONJLϕ,ψ and CONJRϕ,ψ for
each pair of formulas ϕ and ψ; a rule ALLLx,ϕ,t for each variable x, formula ϕ, and term t;
and a rule ALLRx,ϕ for each variable x and formula ϕ.
The eigenformula is part of the rule. Hence we have a countably infinite number of rules.
The effect is defined as follows, where we use semicolons (;) to separate set elements:
eﬀ AXa (Γ,Atm aB ∆,Atm a) /0
eﬀ NEGRϕ (ΓB ∆, Neg ϕ) {Γ, ϕB ∆}
eﬀ NEGLϕ (Γ,Neg ϕB ∆) {ΓB ∆, ϕ}
eﬀ CONJLϕ,ψ (Γ,Conj ϕ ψB ∆) {Γ, ϕ, ψB ∆}
eﬀ CONJRϕ,ψ (ΓB ∆, Conj ϕ ψ) {ΓB ∆, ϕ; ΓB ∆, ψ}
eﬀ ALLLx,ϕ,t (Γ,All x ϕB ∆) {Γ,All x ϕ, ϕ[t/x]B ∆}
eﬀ ALLRx,ϕ (ΓB ∆, All x ϕ) {ΓB ∆, ϕ[y/x]} where y is fresh for Γ and All x ϕ
3.3 Derivation Trees
Finitely branching, possibly infinite trees with nodes labeled by elements in a set α are
represented by the following codatatype:
codatatype α tree = Node (lab: α) (sub: (α tree) fset)
This definition introduces a constructor Node : α→ (α tree) fset→ α tree and two selectors
lab : α tree→ α and sub : α tree→ (α tree) fset. Trees have the form Node a Ts, where a is
the tree’s label and Ts is the finite set of its (immediate) subtrees. The codatatype keyword
indicates that, unlike for inductive datatypes, this tree formation rule may be iterated an
infinite number of times to create infinitely deep objects.
Remark 3 Inductive datatypes can also store infinite objects, provided the constructors are
infinitely branching. However, the infiniteness of these objects manifests itself in breadth
only. The following examples illustrate this distinction:
datatype α tree1 = Leaf α | Node (nat→ α tree1)
codatatype α tree2 = Leaf α | Node (nat→ α tree2)
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Due to infinite branching over the type nat, the elements of the datatype α tree1 can be
infinite, and indeed of unbounded depth—however, they will never have a genuinely infinite
depth, as witnessed by an infinite path. By contrast, the elements of the codatatype α tree2
can have infinite paths (but need not to).
A step combines the current sequent and the rule to be applied. Derivation trees are
defined as trees labeled by steps:
step= sequent× rule dtree= step tree
We think of the root’s label (s, r) as representing the proved goal s and the first (backwards)
applied rule r. The well-formed derivation trees are captured by the predicate wf : dtree→
bool defined by the coinductive rule
eﬀ r s (image (fst◦ lab) Ts) ∀T ∈Ts. wf T
WF
wf (Node (s, r) Ts)
The term image f A denotes the image of set A through function f , and fst is the left projec-
tion operator (i.e., fst (x, y)= x). The first assumption requires that the rule r from the root be
applied to obtain the subtrees’ labels. The second assumption requires that wellformedness
holds for the immediate subtrees. The coinductive interpretation of the definition ensures
that the iteration of this rule can cover infinite trees; this would not be the case with an
inductive interpretation.
Double lines distinguish coinductive rules from their inductive counterparts. Thus, the
predicate wf is the greatest (weakest) solution to the equivalence
wf (Node (s, r) Ts) ⇐⇒ eﬀ r s (image (fst◦ lab) Ts) ∧ (∀T ∈Ts. wf T )
which is also the greatest solution to the implication
wf (Node (s, r) Ts) ⇒ eﬀ r s (image (fst◦ lab) Ts) ∧ (∀T ∈Ts. wf T )
To establish a fact of the form ∀T. P T ⇒ wf T with P : dtree→ bool, a proof by coin-
duction on the definition of wf proceeds by simply showing that P is also a solution of the
same implication:
P (Node (s, r) Ts) ⇒ eﬀ r s (image (fst◦ lab) Ts) ∧ (∀T ∈Ts. P T )
3.4 Proofs
The finite derivation trees can be carved out of the codatatype dtree using the predicate ﬁnite
defined inductively (i.e., as a least fixpoint) by the rule
∀T ∈Ts. ﬁnite T
FIN
ﬁnite (Node (s, r) Ts)
Indeed, the inductive interpretation is the right one for defining ﬁnite, since we want to en-
force the well-founded iteration of the rule. (By contrast, a coinductive interpretation would
classify all trees as “finite,” which is certainly not desirable.)
A proof of a sequent s is a finite well-formed derivation tree with s at its root:
proof T s ⇐⇒ ﬁnite T ∧ wf T ∧ fst (lab T ) = s
An infinite well-formed derivation tree represents a failed proof attempt.
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AXp(y)∀x. p(x), p(y) B p(y)
ALLLx,p(x),y∀x. p(x) B p(y)
AXp(z)∀x. p(x), p(z) B p(z)
ALLLx,p(x),z∀x. p(x) B p(z)
CONJRp(y), p(z)∀x. p(x) B p(y)∧ p(z)
Fig. 1 A proof
AXp(y)∀x. p(x), p(y) B p(y)
ALLLx,p(x),y∀x. p(x) B p(y)
...
ALLLx,p(x),y∀x. p(x), p(y) B p(z)
ALLLx,p(x),y∀x. p(x), p(y) B p(z)
ALLLx,p(x),y∀x. p(x) B p(z)
CONJRp(y), p(z)∀x. p(x) B p(y)∧ p(z)
Fig. 2 A failed proof attempt
Example 4 Given the instantiation of Example 2, Figure 1 shows a finite derivation tree for
the sequent All x (p(x)) B Conj (p(y)) (p(z)) written using the familiar syntax for logical
symbols. Figure 2 shows an infinite tree for the same sequent.
3.5 Soundness
We assume that the rules are locally sound.
Local Soundness: ∀r s ss. eﬀ r s ss ∧ (∀s′ ∈ ss. |= s′) ⇒ |= s
The soundness theorem follows by induction on the finiteness of trees representing proofs.
Theorem 5 Assume the rule system fulfills Local Soundness.Then every sequent that has a
proof is satisfied by all structures. Formally:
∀s. (∃T. proof T s) ⇒ |= s
3.6 Infinite Paths and König’s Lemma
An infinite path in a derivation tree can be regarded as a way to “escape” the proof. To
represent infinite paths independently of trees, we introduce the codatatype of streams over
a type α with the constructor SCons and the selectors shead and stail:
codatatype α stream = SCons (shead: α) (stail: α stream)
The coinductive predicate ipath : dtree → step stream → bool determines whether a
stream of steps is an infinite path in a tree:
T ∈ Ts ipath T σ
IPATH
ipath (Node (s, r) Ts) (SCons (s, r) σ)
Our notion of a tree being finite can be shown to coincide with the more standard notion
of having a finite number of nodes. Hence the following result is a variant of König’s lemma.
Its proof allows us to show a first simple corecursive definition.
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Lemma 6 If the tree T is infinite (i.e., non-finite), there exists an infinite path σ in T .
Proof By the contrapositive of FIN, if Node (s, r) Ts is infinite, there exists an infinite sub-
tree T ∈ Ts. Let f : {T ∈ dtree | ¬ ﬁnite T} → {T ∈ dtree | ¬ ﬁnite T} be a function wit-
nessing this fact—i.e., f T is an immediate infinite subtree of T . The desired infinite path
p : {T ∈ dtree. ¬ ﬁnite T} → step stream can be defined by primitive corecursion over the
codatatype of streams: p T = SCons (lab T ) (p ( f T )). Equivalently, in terms of the selectors:
shead (p T ) = lab T stail (p T ) = p ( f T )
Thus, ipath (p T ) T by straightforward coinduction on the definition of ipath. uunionsq
Remark 7 Essentially the same proof would hold if we allowed our trees to be infinitely
branching, by replacing finite sets with countable sets in the definition of the tree codatatype.
This may seem counterintuitive if we think of the standard formulation of König’s lemma,
but ﬁnite would no longer mean having a finite number of nodes—it would simply mean
“well founded.”
The following extension of König’s lemma applies to well-formed derivation trees, al-
lowing one to construct an infinite path satisfying a unary invariant on its steps and a binary
invariant on pairs of neighbored steps. The latter additionally takes the transition rule be-
tween the neighbored steps into account. The lemma’s statement involves the “always” pred-
icate defined coinductively for streams over any set β, namely, alw : (β stream→ bool)→
β stream→ bool, where alw P xs states that the predicate P holds for all suffixes of xs:
P xs alw P (stail xs)
ALW
alw P xs
Lemma 8 Fix the set α and the predicates I : sequent×α→ bool and P : sequent×α→
rule→ sequent×α→ bool. Assume that
∀r s ss a. eﬀ r s ss ∧ I (s, a)⇒ (∃s′ a′. s′ ∈ ss ∧ I (s′, a′) ∧ P (s, a) r (s′, a′))
If the tree T is well formed, there exists a stream ρ ∈ (step×α) stream such that its first
projection is an infinite path in T (formally, ipath T (smap fst ρ)) and ρ satisfies the predicate
alw (λρ′. let ((s, r), a) = shead ρ′ and ((s′, _), a′) = shead (stail ρ′)
in I (s, a) ∧ P (s, a) r (s′, a′))
In the above lemma, the assumption is that, for any sequent s, rule r, and element a ∈ α
such that the predicate I holds for (s, a), there exists a premise sequent s′ along the backward
application of r and an element a′ such that I again holds for (s′, a′) and the predicate P holds
for (s, a), r, and (s′, a′). The conclusion is that there exists an infinite path in the tree along
which I and P always hold.
The proof is similar to that of Lemma 6, but it requires a slightly more complex func-
tion f , namely f : B→ B, where B = {(T, a) ∈ dtree× α | I (fst (lab T ), a)}, such that
P (fst (lab T ), a) r (fst (lab T ′), a′) holds whenever (T, a) ∈ B and (T ′, a′) = f (T, a). The
lemma’s assumption ensures such a choice of f is possible.
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3.7 Escape Paths
An escape path is a stream of steps that can form an infinite path in a derivation tree. It is
defined coinductively as the predicate epath : step stream→ bool, which requires that every
element in the given stream be obtained by applying an existing rule and choosing one of
the resulting sequents:
eﬀ r s ss s′ ∈ ss epath (SCons (s′, r ′) σ)
EPATH
epath (SCons (s, r) (SCons (s′, r ′) σ))
The following lemma is easy to prove by coinduction on the definition of epath.
Lemma 9 For any stream σ and tree T , if wf T and ipath σ T , then epath σ.
Example 10 The stream
∀x. p(x)B p(y)∧ p(z), CONJRp(y), p(z)) · (∀x. p(x)B p(z), ALLLx,p(x),y) ·
(∀x. p(x), p(y)B p(z), ALLLx,p(x),y)∞
where (s, r) ·σ= SCons (s, r) σ and (s, r)∞ = (s, r) · (s, r) · . . . , is an escape path for the tree
of Figure 2.
3.8 Countermodel Paths
A countermodel path is a sequence of steps that witnesses the unprovability of a sequent s.
Any escape path starting at s is a candidate for a countermodel path, given that it indicates a
way to apply the proof rules without reaching any result. For it to be a genuine countermodel
path, all possible proofs must have been attempted. More specifically, whenever a rule be-
comes enabled along the escape path, it is eventually applied later in the sequence. For FOL
with its standard sequents, such paths can be used to produce actual countermodels by in-
terpreting all statements along the path on the left of the sequents as true, and all statements
on the right as false.
Formally, a rule r is enabled in a sequent s if it has an effect (i.e., eﬀ r s ss for some ss).
This is written enabled r s. For any rule r and stream σ:
– takenr σ states that r is taken at the start of the stream (i.e., sheadσ= (s, r) for some s);
– enabledAtr σ states that r is enabled at the beginning of the stream (i.e., if shead σ =
(s, r ′), then enabled r s);
Recall that, given any set α, predicate P : α stream→ bool, and stream xs ∈ α stream,
the predicate alw P xs (“always P”) states that P is true for all suffixes of xs. Dually, we take
ev P σ (“eventually P”) to mean that P is true for some suffix of xs.
A stream σ is saturated if, at each point, any enabled rule is taken at a later point:
saturated σ ⇐⇒ (∀r∈ rule. alw (λσ′. enabledAtr σ′⇒ ev takenr σ′) σ)
A countermodel path for a sequent s is a saturated escape path σ starting at s:
countermodelPath s σ ⇐⇒ epath σ ∧ saturated σ ∧ fst (shead σ) = s
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...
ALLLx,p(x),t4∀x. p(x), p(t1), p(t2), p(t3) B q(y) ALLLx,p(x),t3∀x. p(x), p(t1), p(t2) B q(y) ALLLx,p(x),t2∀x. p(x), p(t1) B q(y) ALLLx,p(x),t1∀x. p(x) B q(y)
Fig. 3 A derivation tree with a countermodel path
Example 11 The escape path presented in Example 10 is not saturated, since the rule
ALLLx,p(x),z is enabled starting from the first position but never taken.
Example 12 The escape path in the tree of Figure 3 is a countermodel path for ∀x. p(x) B
q(y), assuming that each possible term occurs infinitely often in the sequence t1, t2, . . . . The
enabled rules along the escape path are all of the form ALLLx,p(x),_, and they are all always
eventually taken.
3.9 Completeness
For the proof of completeness, we assume that the set of rules fulfills two properties:
– Availability: For each sequent, at least one rule is enabled (i.e., ∀s. ∃r. enabled r s).
– Persistence: For each sequent, if a rule is enabled but not taken, it remains enabled (i.e.,
∀s r r ′ s′ ss. enabled r ′ s ∧ r′ 6= r ∧ eﬀ r s ss ∧ s′ ∈ set ss ⇒ enabled r ′ s′).
(We will later remove the first condition with Theorem 18.) The above conditions are local
properties of the effects of rules, not global properties of the proof system. This makes them
easy to verify for particular systems.
Remark 13 The saturation condition on streams of steps from Section 3.8 is stronger than
the standard properties of fairness and justice [21]. Fairness would require the rules to be
continuously enabled to guarantee that they are eventually taken. Justice is stronger in that
it would require the rules to be enabled infinitely often, but not necessarily continuously.
Saturation goes further: If a rule is ever enabled, it will certainly be chosen at a later point.
Saturation may seem too strong for the task at hand. However, in the presence of Persistence,
a rule enabled at some point and never taken will be continuously (in particular, infinitely
often) enabled; hence the notions of fairness, justice, and saturation all coincide.
In addition to Availability and Persistence, we assume a function herbrand : sequent→
step stream→ structure that maps countermodel paths to actual countermodels:
Herbrandness: ∀s σ. countermodelPath s σ⇒ herbrand s σ 6|= s
A countermodel path provides an argument against provability. That this argument fully
complements provability is the essence of the completeness theorem in its abstract form:
Lemma 14 Assume the rule system fulfills Availability and Persistence. Then every sequent
admits a proof or a countermodel path. Formally:
∀s. (∃T. proof T s) ∨ (∃σ. countermodelPath s σ)
Proof The proof uses the following combinators:
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– stake : α stream→ nat→ α list maps ρ and n to the list of the first n elements of ρ;
– smap : (α→ β)→ α stream→ β stream maps a function to every element of the stream;
– nats : nat stream denotes the stream of natural numbers: 0 ·1 ·2 ·3 · . . . ;
– ﬂat : (α list) stream→ α stream maps a stream of finite nonempty lists to the stream
obtained by concatenating those lists;
– sdropWhile : (α→ bool)→ α stream→ α stream removes the maximal prefix of ele-
ments that fulfill a given predicate from a given stream (or returns an irrelevant default
value if the predicate holds for all elements).
We start by constructing a fair stream of rules fenum—i.e., every rule occurs infinitely
often in fenum. Let enum be a stream whose elements cover the entire set rule, which
is required to be countable. Take fenum = ﬂat (smap (stake enum) (stail nats)). Thus, if
enum= r1 · r2 · r3 · . . . , then fenum= r1 · r1 · r2 · r1 · r2 · r3 · . . . .
Let s be a sequent. Using fenum, we build a derivation tree T0 labeled with s such that
all its infinite paths are saturated. Let fair be the subset of rule stream consisting of the fair
streams. Clearly, any suffix of an element in fair also belongs to fair. In particular, fenum and
all its suffixes belong to fair. Given ρ∈ fair and s∈ sequent, sdropWhile (λr. ¬ enabled r s) ρ
has the form SCons r ρ′, making r the first enabled rule in ρ. Such a rule exists because, by
Availability, at least one rule is enabled at s and, by fairness, all the rules occur in ρ. Since
enabled r s, we can pick a set of sequents ss such that eﬀ r s ss. We define mkTree : fair→
sequent→ dtree corecursively as
mkTree ρ s= Node (s, r) (image (mkTree ρ′) ss)
We prove that, for all ρ ∈ fair and s, the derivation tree mkTree ρ s is well formed and
all its infinite paths are saturated. Wellformedness is obvious because at each point the con-
tinuation is built starting with the effect of a rule. For saturation, we show that if rule r
is enabled at sequent s and ipath (mkTree ρ s) σ, then r appears along σ (i.e., there exists
a sequent s′ such that (s′, r) is in σ). This follows by induction on the position of r in ρ,
pos r ρ—formally, the length of the shortest list ρ0 such that ρ = ρ0 @SCons r _, where @
denotes concatenation.
Let r′ be the first rule from ρ enabled at sequent s. If r = r′, then mkTree ρ s has label
(s, r) already. Otherwise, ρ has the form ρ1 @ [r′]@ ρ′, with r not in ρ1, hence pos r ρ′ <
pos r ρ. From the definitions of ipath and mkTree, it follows that ipath (mkTree ρ′ s′) (stailσ)
holds for some s′ ∈ ss such that eﬀ r s′ ss. By the induction hypothesis, r appears along
stail σ, hence along σ as desired. In particular, T0 =mkTree fenum s is well formed and all
its infinite paths are saturated.
Finally, if T0 is finite, it is the desired proof of s. Otherwise, by Lemma 6 (König)
it has an infinite path. This path is necessarily saturated; by Lemma 9, it is the desired
countermodel path. uunionsq
Lemma 14 captures the abstract essence of arguments from the literature, although this is
sometimes hard to grasp under the thick forest of syntactic details and concrete strategies for
fair enumeration: A fair tree is constructed, which attempts a proof; in case of failure, the tree
exhibits a saturated escape path. By Herbrandness, we immediately obtain completeness:
Theorem 15 Fix a rule system and assume that it fulfills Availability, Persistence, and Her-
brandness. Then every sequent that is satisfied by all structures admits a proof:
∀s. |= s ⇒ (∃T. proof T s)
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Proof Given s such that |= s, assume by absurdity that there exists no T such that proof T s.
By Lemma 14, we obtain σ such that countermodelPath s σ. Then, by Herbrandness, we
have herbrand s σ 6|= s, which contradicts |= s. uunionsq
Remark 16 If we are not interested in witnessing the proof attempt closely, Lemma 14 can
be established more directly by building the fair path without going through an intermediate
fair tree. The key observation is that if a sequent s has no proof and eﬀ r s ss, there must
exist a sequent s′ ∈ ss that has no proof. (Otherwise, we could compose the proofs of all s′
into a proof of s by applying rule r.) Let pick r s ss denote such an s′. We proceed directly
to the construction of a saturated escape path as a corecursive predicate mkPath : fair→
{s ∈ sequent. s has no proof} → step stream following the same idea as for the previous
tree construction (function mkTree):
mkPath ρ s= SCons (s, r) (mkPath ρ′ (pick r s ss))
where again SCons r ρ′ = sdropWhile (λr. ¬ enabled r s) ρ and ss is such that eﬀ r s ss.
Fairness of mkPath ρ s follows by a similar argument as before for fairness of the tree.
3.10 Omitting the Availability Assumption
The abstract completeness result (Lemma 14) assumes Availability and Persistence. Among
these assumptions, Persistence is essential: It ensures that the constructed fair path is satu-
rated, meaning that every rule available at any point is eventually applied. Availability can be
added later to the system without affecting its behavior by introducing a special “idle” rule.
Lemma 17 A rule system R = (sequent, rule, eﬀ) that fulfills Persistence can be trans-
formed into the rule system Ridle = (sequent, ruleidle, eﬀidle) that fulfills both Persistence
and Availability, with ruleidle = rule ∪ {IDLE} and eﬀidle behaving like eﬀ on rule and
eﬀidle IDLE s ss ⇐⇒ ss = {s}.
Proof Availability for the modified system follows from the continuous enabledness of
IDLE. Persistence follows from the Persistence of the original system together with the prop-
erty that IDLE is continuously enabled and does not alter the sequent. The modified system
is equivalent to the original one because IDLE does not alter the sequent. uunionsq
Now we can rephrase Theorem 15 to assume Persistence and a slight variation of the
Herbrandness condition. All the concepts refer as before to the rule system R, except for
countermodelPathidle, which refers toRidle:
Herbrandnessidle: ∀s σ. countermodelPathidle s σ⇒ herbrand s σ 6|= s
Theorem 18 Let R be a rule system that fulfills Persistence and Herbrandnessidle. Then
every sequent that is satisfied by all structures admits a proof inR.
Proof We apply Lemma 14 to the system Ridle to obtain that every sequent admits either a
proof or a countermodel path, both in this system. Since Ridle is an extension of R with a
single rule, any proof in R corresponds to a proof in Ridle. Conversely, any proof in Ridle
can be transformed into a proof in R by omitting all applications of IDLE. We thus proved
that every sequent admits a proof inR or a countermodel path overRidle. We can then apply
Herbrandnessidle, just as we did with Herbrandness for Theorem 18. uunionsq
Remark 19 The addition of IDLE is inspired by, and similarly motivated as, that of idle
transitions to Kripke structures in the context of temporal logic, where it is technically con-
venient to consider only infinite paths.
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4 Concrete Instances of Soundness and Completeness
The abstract soundness is based on the Local Soundness assumption, which is easy to verify
for all the considered instances. Therefore, below we focus on completeness.
4.1 Classical First-Order Logic
The abstract completeness proof is parameterized by a rule system. This section concretizes
the result for the Gentzen system from Section 2.1 to derive the standard completeness
theorem. Example 2 recasts it as a rule system; we must verify that it fulfills the Persistence
and Herbrandness conditions.
The Gentzen rules are syntax-directed in that they operate on formulas having specific
connectives or quantifiers at the top. This is what guarantees Persistence. For example, an
application of AXa (which affects only the atom a) leaves any potential enabledness of
ALLLx,ϕ,t (which affects only formulas with All at the top) unchanged, and vice versa; more-
over, AXa does not overlap with AXb for a 6= b. A minor subtlety concerns ALLRx,ϕ, which
requires the existence of a fresh y in order to be enabled. Persistence holds because the se-
quents are finite, so we can always find a fresh variable in the countably infinite set var.
On the other hand, Availability does not hold; for example, the sequent p(x) B q(x) has no
enabled rule. Hence, we need Theorem 18 and its IDLE rule.
To infer the standard completeness theorem from Theorem 18, it suffices to define a
suitable function herbrand. Let σ be a countermodel path for Γ B ∆ (i.e., a saturated escape
path starting at Γ B ∆). Let Γ˜ be the union of the left-hand sides of sequents occurring in σ,
and let ∆˜ be the union of the corresponding right-hand sides. Clearly, Γ⊆ Γ˜ and ∆⊆ ∆˜. We
define herbrand (Γ B ∆) σ to beS = (S, F, P), where
– S is the set of terms, term;
– for each n-ary f and p and each t1, . . . , tn ∈ S:
– Ff (t1, . . . , tn) = f (t1, . . . , tn);
– Pp (t1, . . . , tn) ⇐⇒ p(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ Γ˜.
In what follows, we employ the substitution lemma, which relates the notions of satis-
faction and substitution:
Lemma 20 S |=ξ ϕ[t/x] iff S |=ξ[x← JtKSξ ] ϕ.
Lemma 21 The structure herbrand (Γ B ∆) σ is a countermodel for Γ B ∆, meaning that
there exists a valuation ξ : var→ S such thatS 6|=ξ Γ B ∆.
Proof First, the pair (Γ˜, ∆˜) from the definition of herbrand can be shown to be well behaved
with respect to all the connectives and quantifiers in the following sense:
1. For all atoms a, Atm a /∈ Γ˜ ∩ ∆˜.
2. If Neg ϕ ∈ Γ˜, then ϕ ∈ ∆˜.
3. If Neg ϕ ∈ ∆˜, then ϕ ∈ Γ˜.
4. If Conj ϕ ψ ∈ Γ˜, then ϕ ∈ Γ˜ and ψ ∈ Γ˜.
5. If Conj ϕ ψ ∈ ∆˜, then ϕ ∈ ∆˜ or ψ ∈ ∆˜.
6. If All x ϕ ∈ Γ˜, then ϕ[t/x] ∈ Γ˜ for all t.
7. If All x ϕ ∈ ∆˜, then there exists a variable y such that ϕ[y/x] ∈ ∆˜.
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A pair (Γ˜, ∆˜) fulfilling these properties is sometimes called a Hintikka set [1, 22]. These
properties follow from the saturation ofσwith respect to the corresponding rules. The proofs
are routine. For example:
1. If Atm a ∈ Γ˜ ∩ ∆˜, the rule AXa is enabled in σ and hence, by saturation, it is eventually
taken. This is impossible since this is a rule without premises, whose application would
prevent the continuation of the infinite sequence σ.
6. If All x ϕ ∈ Γ˜ and t is a term, ALLLx,ϕ,t is enabled in σ and hence eventually taken,
ensuring that ϕ[t/x] ∈ Γ˜.
Let ξ be the embedding of variables into terms. To proveS 6|=ξ ΓB ∆, it suffices to show
that ∀ϕ∈ Γ˜. S |=ξ ϕ and ∀ϕ∈ ∆˜. S 6|=ξ ϕ. These two facts follow together by induction on
the depth of ϕ. In the base case, if Atm a ∈ Γ˜, then S |=ξ Atm a follows directly from
the definition of S ; moreover, if Atm a ∈ ∆˜, then by property 1 Atm a 6∈ Γ˜, hence again
S 6|=ξ Atm a follows from the definition of S. The only nontrivial inductive case is All,
which requires Lemma 20. Assume All x ϕ ∈ Γ˜. By property 6, we have ϕ[t/x] ∈ Γ˜ for any t.
Hence, by the induction hypothesis,S |=ξ ϕ[t/x]. By Lemma 20,S |=ξ[x←t] ϕ for all t; that
is,S |=ξ All x ϕ. The second fact, concerning ∆˜, follows similarly from property 7. uunionsq
We have thus obtained:
Corollary 22 A sequent is provable by a (finite) proof in the Gentzen system of classical
FOL iff it is satisfied by all FOL structures.
Remark 23 The rule ALLL stores, in the left context, a copy of the universal formula All x ϕ
when applied backwards. This is crucial for concrete completeness since a fair enumeration
should try all the t instances of the universally quantified variable x, which requires Avail-
ability of All x ϕ even after its use. If we labeled ALLL as ALLLx,ϕ instead of ALLLx,ϕ,t,
thereby delegating the choice of t to the nondeterminism of eﬀ, the system would still be per-
sistent as required by the abstract completeness proof, but Lemma 21 (and hence concrete
completeness) would not hold—property 6 from the lemma’s proof would fail.
4.2 Further Instances
Theorem 18 is applicable to classical FOL Gentzen systems from the literature, in several
variants: with sequent components represented as lists, multisets, or sets, one-sided or two-
sided, and so on. This includes the systems G′, GCNF′, G, and G= from Gallier [22] and G1,
G2, G3, GS1, GS2, and GS3 from Troelstra and Schwichtenberg [51]. Persistence is easy
to check. The syntax-independent part of the argument is provided by Theorem 18, while
an ad hoc step analogous to Lemma 21 is required to build a concrete countermodel from a
countermodel path to complete the proof.
Several FOL refutation systems based on tableaux or resolution are instances of the ab-
stract theorem, providing that we read the abstract notion of “proof” as “refutation” and
“countermodel” as “model.” Nondestructive tableaux [26]—including those presented in
Bell and Machover [1] and in Fitting [20]—are usually persistent when regarded as deriva-
tion systems. After an application of Theorem 18, the ad hoc argument for interpreting the
abstract model is similar to that for Gentzen systems (Lemma 21).
Regrettably, abstract completeness is not directly applicable beyond classical logic. It is
generally not clear how to extract a specific model from a nonstandard logic from an abstract
(proof-theoretic) model. Another issue is that standard sequent systems for nonclassical
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variations of FOL such as modal or intuitionistic logics do not have Persistence. A typical
right rule for the modal operator  (“must”) is as follows [51]:
 Γ B ♦ ∆, ϕ
MUSTR
 Γ B ♦ ∆, ϕ
To be applicable, the rule requires that all the formulas in the context surrounding the eigen-
formula have  or ♦ at the top. Other rules may remove these operators, or introduce for-
mulas that do not have them, thus disabling MUSTR.
Recent work targeted at simplifying completeness arguments [37] organizes modal log-
ics as labeled transition systems, for which Kripke completeness is derived. (The technique
also applies to the completeness of intuitionistic logic with respect to Kripke semantics.) In
the proposed systems, the above rule becomes
Γ, w R w′ B ∆, w′ : ϕ MUSTR′
(w′ fresh)Γ B ∆, w : ϕ
The use of labels for worlds (w,w′) and the bookkeeping of the accessibility relation R
makes it possible to recast the rule so that either no facts (as above) or only resilient facts are
ever assumed about the surrounding context. The resulting proof system fulfills Persistence,
enabling Theorem 18. The Kripke countermodel construction is roughly as for classical FOL
Gentzen systems.
5 Abstract Infinite-Proof Soundness
In the previous sections, completeness is established by analyzing the interplay between the
existence of finite proof trees (representing valid proofs) and certain infinite proof trees (used
to produce countermodels). In this section, we look into the question: When can infinite
proof trees be accepted as valid proofs?
We give a coinductive account of the abstract development of Brotherston et al. [16],
in a slightly more general form since we work with arbitrary infinite proofs, which may
be acyclic. We start by recalling some motivation and intuition about cyclic proofs, in the
context of the FOLind logic from Section 2.2. It is clear that the rules of the FOLind Gentzen
system are (locally) sound for inductive structures. Hence, any finite proof tree built using
these rules represents a valid proof, in that its root sequent is known to be satisfied by all
inductive structures. But other proofs are permissible too.
For the language of Example 1 from Section 2.2, consider the cyclic tree of Figure 4,
where one of the leaf nodes is not an axiom, but rather a link L “back” to the root of the tree
(decorated with L). A cyclic proof indicates that, when L is reached, the (backward) proof
continues with the sequent that L points to. Thus, the intended proof corresponding to the
cyclic tree from Figure 4 is the infinite tree from Figure 5.
5.1 Soundness of Infinite Proof Trees
We fix the countable sets sequent and rule for sequents and rules, the class structure, and the
satisfaction relation |= : structure→ sequent→ bool, writing |= s for ∀S ∈ structure. S |= s.
In addition, we fix the following:
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ODD0
even(0) B odd(Suc(0))
Link L
SUBSTy,x
even(y) B odd(Suc(y))
ODDSuc
even(y) B odd(Suc(Suc(Suc(y))))
EVENsplit
L :: even(x) B odd(Suc(x))
Fig. 4 A cyclic proof tree
ODD0
even(0) B odd(Suc(0))
...
even(x) B odd(Suc(x))
SUBSTy,x
even(y) B odd(Suc(y))
ODDSuc
even(y) B odd(Suc(Suc(Suc(y))))
EVENsplit
even(x) B odd(Suc(x))
Fig. 5 The infinite proof tree corresponding to the cyclic proof tree of Figure 4
– a set marker of items called markers;
– a marking function mark : {(s, r, s′) ∈ sequent× rule× sequent | ∃ss. eﬀ s r ss ∧ s′ ∈
ss}→ (marker×bool×marker) set;
– an ordinal ord, with < and ≤ denoting its strict and nonstrict order relations;
– a height function height : marker× structure→ ord.
The marking function associates a set of triples (M, b,M′) with every backward application
(s, r, s′) of every rule. In (s, r, s′), the rule r is thought of as being applied to s and then one
of the resulting sequents, s′, being chosen. In (M, b,M′), the Boolean value b being False
means “stay” and b being True means “decrease.” The “stay” and “decrease” directives
refer to how the height function height should evolve along this rule application: Given a
sequent s, a countermodel S for it and a rule r that yields a set of sequents ss when applied
to s, there should exist a sequent s′ ∈ ss and a countermodel S ′ of s′ such that, for all
(M, b,M′) ∈mark (s, r, s′), when moving from (M, S ) to (M′, S ′):
– the height should at least stay the same (or decrease) when b says “stay”;
– the height should decrease when b says “decrease.”
Formally, we postulate the following condition:
Descent: For all S and s such that S 6|= s and all r, ss such that eﬀ s r ss, there exist
S ′ and s′ ∈ ss such that S ′ 6|= s′ and descent (s, S ) r (s′, S ′).
In the above, descent : sequent× structure→ rule→ sequent× structure→ bool is defined
as follows:
descent (s, S ) r (s′, S ′) ⇐⇒
(∀M b M′. (M, b,M′) ∈mark (s, r, s′) ⇒
(b= False ∧ height (M′, S ′)≤ height (M, S )) ∨
(b= True ∧ height (M′, S ′) < height (M, S )))
Remark 24 The Descent condition is a strengthening of the Local Soundness condition
from Section 3.5: Removing the “and descent (s, S ) r (s′, S ′)” part yields the contrapositive
of Local Soundness. Essentially, Descent is a form of Local Soundness with the additional
requirement that the marking function’s directives must be respected.
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Under the Descent assumption, we can identify certain “good” infinite proof trees that
can be accepted as valid proofs along with the finite ones. First, we need the notion of
a stream of Booleans and a stream of markers following an infinite path. The predicate
follow : bool stream→marker stream→ step stream→ bool is defined coinductively:
(M, b, shead Ms) ∈mark (s, r, fst (shead σ)) follow bs Ms σ
FOLLOW
follow (SCons b bs) (SCons M Ms) (SCons (s, r) σ)
Thus, follow bs Msσ states that, for any consecutive steps (s, r), (s′, _) in σ, the correspond-
ing markers M,M′ in Ms and the Boolean corresponding to the first of these, b in bs, have
the property that (M, b,M′)∈mark (s, r, s′); in other words, the streams bs and Ms represent
choices of the sets of markers for σ.
We define a tree to be good if each of its infinite paths has some streams of Booleans and
markers that eventually follow it (i.e., follow a suffix of it), in such a way that the Booleans
indicate infinite decrease:
good T ⇐⇒ (∀σ. ipath T σ⇒ ev (λσ′. ∃bs Ms. follow bs Ms σ′∧ infDecr bs) σ)
where the infinite decrease of a Boolean stream simply means True (“decrease”) occurring
infinitely often:
infDecr = alw (ev (λ bs. shead bs = True))
A (potentially) infinite proof of a sequent, or iproof, is then defined as a good, well-formed
tree having that sequent at the root:
iproof T s ⇐⇒ wf T ∧ good T ∧ fst (lab T ) = s
Since finite trees (have no infinite paths and hence) are trivially good, (finite) proofs are
particular cases of iproofs. Our goal is to show that iproofs are also sound.
Theorem 25 Assume the rule system fulfills Descent. Then every sequent that has an iproof
is satisfied by all structures:
∀s. (∃T. iproof T s)⇒ |= s
Proof Fix s and T such that iproof T s and assume by absurdity that 6|= s, meaning there
exists S such that S 6|= s. To obtain a contradiction, we proceed as follows:
1. Applying Lemma 8 (Section 3.6) for α= structure, I = λ(s, S). S 6|= s and P= descent
to the Descent assumption, we obtain a stream δ of step–structure pairs (i.e., of sequent–
rule–structure triples) ((s, r), S), such that, at each point in the stream, the structure S is
a countermodel for the sequent s and descent holds for any two consecutive elements.
Formally, we have alwCmodDesc δ (“always countermodel and descending”), where
alwCmodDesc is defined as
alw (λδ. let ((s, r), S) = shead δ and ((s′, _), S′) = shead (stail δ)
in S 6|= s ∧ descent (s, S) r (s′, S′))
and the step components of δ form an infinite path in T : ipath T (smap fst δ).
2. Using the goodness of T , we obtain the streams bs and Ms that follow a suffix σ′ of
smap fst δ:
∃σ′ σ′′ bs Ms. smap fst δ= σ′′@σ′ ∧ follow bs Ms σ′ ∧ infDecr bs
where @ denotes concatenation of a list and a stream.
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3. Taking the suffix δ′ of δ that corresponds to the suffix σ′ of its step component smap fst δ
(formally, defining δ′ to be stake (length σ′) δ), we end up with the streams δ′, bs and
Ms such that
– follow bs Ms (smap fst δ′);
– infDecr bs;
– alwCmodDesc δ′ (because alw is invariant under suffix).
4. Let zip denote the pair-zipping of two streams, defined by primitive corecursion as
zip (SCons x xs) (SCons y ys) = SCons (x, y) (zip xs ys). Taking ks = smap height (zip
(smap fst δ′) Ms) (a stream of ord elements), we have that
– ks is always nonstrictly decreasing: alw (λks′. shead ks′ ≥ shead (stail ks′)) ks;
– ks is infinitely often strictly decreasing: alw (ev (λks′. shead (stail ks′)> shead ks′)) ks.
This follows easily by coinduction using the gathered properties for δ′, bs, and Ms.
5. From ks, we obtain the substream ks′ that is always strictly decreasing:
alw (λks′. shead ks′ > shead (stail ks′)) ks′
which is in contradiction with the wellfoundedness of the order < on the ordinal ord. uunionsq
One detail not explained in the above proof is the construction of ks′, a stream of strictly
decreasing items, from ks, a stream of nonstrictly decreasing but always eventually strictly
decreasing items. Informally, if ks is of the form k0 ·k1 · . . . with k0 = k1 = · · ·= kn > kn+1 =
kn+2 = · · ·= kn+m > kn+m+1 = · · ·, then ks′ will be k0 ·kn+1 ·kn+m+1 · . . . ; that is, ks′ will only
contain the “jump” elements. Formally, this construction can be compactly described as
ks′ = bﬁlter (>, ks), where > : ord→ ord→ bool is the dual strict order on ord. The general-
purpose polymorphic “binary filter” combinator, bﬁlter : Dα→ α stream, has as domain the
subset Dα of (α→ α→ bool)× α stream consisting of pairs (P, xs) such that, for every
element x in xs, there exists an element y occurring later in xs such that P x y:
Dα = {(P, xs) | alw (λxs′. ev (λxs′′. P (shead xs′) (shead xs′′)) (stail xs′)) xs}
The bﬁlter function is defined as follows, where bﬁlterP abbreviates bﬁlter (P, _):
bﬁlterP xs = if P (shead xs) (shead (stail xs))
then SCons (shead xs) (bﬁlterP (stail xs))
else bﬁlterP (SCons (shead xs) (stail (stail xs)))
Thus, bﬁlterP collects from a stream all the pairs of elements proximally related by P and
forms a new stream with them. Its definition is neither purely recursive nor purely corecur-
sive. Whereas the call on the ‘then’ branch is corecursive (showing how to produce the first
element in the result stream, shead xs), the call on the ‘else’ branch does not exhibit any
explicit productivity. However, the overall function is well-defined (and indeed productive)
because, thanks to the choice of the domain, at each point there will be at most a finite num-
ber of consecutive calls on the ‘else’ branch, until an element satisfying P (shead xs) is met.
In summary, the recursive call on the ‘else’ branch concurs with the corecursive call on the
‘then’ branch for the welldefinedness of this function.
Thanks to recent infrastructure development [11], Isabelle accepts this mixed recursive–
corecursive definition, after the user has shown that the recursion in the ‘else’ branch calls
terminates: If (P, xs) ∈ Dα, then in particular ev (λxs′′. P (shead xs) (shead xs′′)) holds for
stail xs. If we write xs′ for the input to the recursive call, SCons (shead xs) (stail (stail xs)),
we have that shead xs′ = shead xs and stail xs′ = stail (stail xs). Hence:
numP (shead xs′) (stail xs′) = numP (shead xs) (stail (stail xs))
< numP (shead xs) (stail xs)
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where numP z ys is the number of elements that need to be consumed from ys before reaching
some y such that P z y. The use of such sophisticated corecursive machinery for this example
may seem excessive. But note that bﬁlter is a general-purpose combinator, defined once and
usable for arbitrary predicates P.
For P = > and k0 = k1 = . . . = kn > kn+1 = kn+2 = . . . = kn+m > kn+m+1 = . . . , the exe-
cution of bﬁlter proceeds as follows:
bﬁlterP (k0 · k1 · . . . · kn · kn+1 · kn+2 · . . . · kn+m · kn+m+1 · . . .)
= bﬁlterP (k0 · k2 · . . . · kn · kn+1 · kn+2 · . . . · kn+m · kn+m+1 · . . .)...
= bﬁlterP (k0 · kn+1 · kn+2 · . . . · kn+m · kn+m+1 · . . .)
= k0 ·bﬁlterP (kn+1 · kn+2 · . . . · kn+m · kn+m+1 · . . .)...
= k0 ·bﬁlterP (kn+1 · kn+m · kn+m+1 · . . .)
= k0 · kn+1 ·bﬁlterP (kn+m+1 · . . .)...
5.2 From Cyclic Trees to Infinite Trees
With the general result for the soundness of infinite trees in place, let us come back to the
notion of cyclic tree. In addition to the sets sequent and rule, we assume a set link of links.
The set of cyclic derivation trees is introduced as a datatype:
datatype cdtree = Node step (cdtree fset)
| Link link
Thus, there are two differences between the derivation trees we used so far (dtree) and the
cyclic derivation trees: the latter are restricted to be finite and are allowed to have, in addition
to usual nodes, links to other cyclic derivation trees. To animate the links, we fix a function
pointsTo : link→ cdtree specifying, for each link, where it points to, with the following
requirement:
Good Links: The target of pointsTo is never a link: ∀L L′. pointsTo L 6= Link L′.
Each cyclic derivation tree T yields a derivation tree treeOf T as follows: T is traversed
as if recursively producing treeOf T by the application of the same rules, and when reaching
a Link L one moves to the pointed cyclic tree pointsTo L. Because pointsTo L can be arbi-
trarily large (in particular, larger than T ), the definition of treeOf : cdtree→ dtree cannot
proceed recursively on the domain (cdtree). However, it can naturally proceed corecursively
on the codomain, dtree:
treeOf (Node (s, r) Ts) = Node (s, r) (ﬁmage treeOf Ts)
treeOf (Link L) = treeOf (pointsTo L)
Strictly speaking, the definition is not purely corecursive: In the Link case, it is not apparent
what is the first layer of the result tree. However, since treeOf (pointsTo L) is guaranteed to
not have the form Link L′, hence start with the Node constructor, we know that after exactly
two calls we reach the Node case—so Isabelle has no problem accepting this definition,
again as an instance of recursion–corecursion.
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The root sequent of a cyclic derivation tree, seqOf : cdtree→ sequent, is defined as
expected, following the link when necessary:
seqOf (Node (s, r) Ts) = (s, r)
seqOf (Link L) = seqOf (pointsTo L)
Even though cyclic derivation trees are finite entities, they can exhibit infinite behavior
through the links. Therefore, we must define their wellformedness cwf : cdtree→ bool not
inductively, but coinductively:
eﬀ r s (image seqOf Ts) ∀T ∈Ts. cwf T
CWF-NODE
cwf (Node (s, r) Ts)
cwf (pointsTo L)
CWF-LINK
cwf (Link L)
The CWF-NODE rule is essentially the same as for derivation trees, whereas CWF-LINK
asks the trees pointed by links to be well formed as well.
Now, we can define the notion of being a cyclic proof for a sequent:
cproof T s ⇐⇒ cwf T ∧ good (treeOf L) ∧ seqOf T = s
Goodness being a property stated in terms of infinite traces, it naturally belongs to the (in-
finite) derivation tree of a cyclic derivation tree. It is easy to see that the root sequence of
a cyclic tree T is the same as its generated derivation tree treeOf T , and we can prove by
induction that wellformedness of T implies wellformedness of treeOf T . With Theorem 25,
this immediately gives our desired soundness theorem for cyclic derivation trees.
Theorem 26 Assume the rule system fulfills Descent and the function pointsTo fulfills
Good Links. Then every sequent that has a cyclic proof is satisfied by all structures:
∀s. (∃T. cproof T s) ⇒ |= s
The above theorem is a slight generalization of the result by Brotherston et al. [16]. It is
more general in that it does not require the cyclic proof trees to be regular. If we wanted to
model precisely the regular trees, we would need to further restrain pointsTo; however, such
restrictions do not affect soundness.
6 Concrete Instances of Infinite-Proof Soundness
We consider instances of the abstract development establishing soundness of infinite proofs.
We discuss in detail our running example, FOL with inductive definitions. Then we briefly
mention other possible instances.
6.1 First-Order Logic with Inductive Predicates
Recall FOLind from Section 2.2 and its associated Gentzen system. The abstract structures
(elements of the set structure) are not instantiated by mere concrete structures, but rather by
pairs (S , ξ) where S =
(
S, (Ff ) f ∈ fsym, (Pp)p∈psym
)
is a structure and ξ : var→ S is a
variable valuation. We instantiate the satisfaction relation, (S , ξ) |= ϕ, withS |=ξ ϕ.
To instantiate Theorems 25 and 26, we must define the notion of marker (forming the
set marker), the ordinal ord, and the functions mark : {(s, r, s′) ∈ sequent× rule× sequent |
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∃ss. eﬀ s r ss∧ s′ ∈ ss}→ (marker×bool×marker) set and height :marker×structure→ ord
and verify the Descent property.
We let marker be the set of inductive predicate atoms: {p(t) | p∈ ipsym}. When defining
mark on (s, r, s′), we distinguish three cases:
– Rule r is not of the form SUBSTt,x or psplit. Then, assuming s= (Γ B ∆), we set
mark (s, r, s′) = {(M,False,M) | M ∈marker ∩ Γ}
– Rule r has the form SUBSTt,x. Then s has the form Γ[t/x] B ∆[t/x], and we set
mark (s, r, s′) = {(M[t/x],False,M) | M ∈marker ∩ Γ}
– Rule r has the form psplit for some p ∈ ipsym. Then s has the form Γ, p(x) B ∆, and s′
has the form Γ[t/x], prems(χ′) B ∆[t/x] for some χ ∈ indp. We set
mark (s, r, s′) = {(M,False,M[t/x]) | M ∈marker ∩ Γ} ∪
{(p(x),True, ψ) | ψ ∈marker ∩ prems(χ′)}
We take ord to be nat, the set of natural numbers ordered by the natural order.2 Let
S =
(
S, (Ff ) f ∈ fsym, (Pp)p∈psym
)
be a fixed inductive structure. We define the family of
interpretations (Pp,n : S ar p→ S )p∈ipsym,n∈nat recursively as follows:
– Pp,0 a ⇐⇒ False;
– Pp,n+1 a ⇐⇒ Pp,n a ∨ (∃χ ∈ indp. ∃ξ. a = ξ (varsOf(concl(χ))) ∧ Sn |=ξ prems(χ)),
whereSn =
(
S, (Ff ) f ∈ fsym, (Pp,n)p∈psym
)
and varsOf(concl(χ)) is the tuple x appear-
ing in the conclusion p(x) of χ.
The above predicates are nothing but the finitary approximations of the predicates (Pp :
S ar p→ S )p∈ipsym. Thanks to the inductiveness of S , it is well known that the approxima-
tions converge to their target:
Lemma 27 For all p ∈ ipsym and a ∈ S ar p, we have Pp a iff ∃n. Pp,n a.
We are now ready to define height (M, (S , ξ)). We distinguish two cases:
– AssumeS |=ξ M, and assume M has the form p(t) for p∈ ipsym. Then Pp(JtKSξ ). We let
height (M, (S , ξ)) be the smallest n such that Pp,n(JtKSξ ) (which exists by Lemma 27).
– Assume S 6|=ξ M. Then the value of height (M, (S , ξ)) is irrelevant, and we can put
anything here.
Finally, we verify the Descent condition. Let (S , ξ) and s be such thatS 6|=ξ s, and let
r and ss be such that eﬀ s r ss. We need to provide s′ ∈ ss and (S ′, ξ′) such that S ′ 6|=ξ′ s′
and descent (s, (S , ξ)) r (s′, (S ′, ξ′)) holds. We will actually takeS ′ to beS , so we only
need to provide s′ and ξ′.
We distinguish several cases, following the definition of mark:
– Rule r is not of the form SUBSTt,x or psplit. We further distinguish some subcases:
– r is AX. This is impossible, since AX is sound for all (inductive) structures, which
contradicts the hypothesisS 6|=ξ s.
– r is a single-premise rule involving no freshness side condition, i.e., is one of NEGL,
NEGR, CONJR, ALLL, and pχ. Then we take s′ to be the single premise and ξ′ = ξ.
2 This is acceptable here, since we employ finitary Horn clauses and the language is countable. Different
assumptions may require larger ordinals.
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– r is CONJL. Then we take ξ′ = ξ and s′ to be one of the two premises, say, si, such
thatS 6|=ξ si (which is known to exist by the soundness of CONJL).
– r is ALLR. Then s = (Γ B ∆, All x ϕ), and we take s′ to be the only premise of
r, namely, s′ = Γ B ∆, ϕ[y/x], where y is known to be fresh. Since S 6|=ξ All x ϕ,
we obtain a ∈ S such that S 6|=ξ[x←a] ϕ; by the freshness of y, this also implies
S 6|=ξ[y←a] ϕ[y/x]. We let ξ′ = ξ[y← a].
– Rule r has the form SUBSTt,x. Then s has the form Γ[t/x] B ∆[t/x]. We set ξ′ = ξ[x←JtKSξ ] and s to the only premise of r.
– Rule r has the form psplit for some p ∈ ipsym. Then s has the form Γ, p(x) B ∆. Since
S |=ξ p(x), we have Pp (ξ x), and let m be the least number such that Pp,m (ξ x). By the
definition of Pp,_, m> 0 and there exist χ∈ indp and the valuation ξ′′ such that ξ x= ξ′′ x
andSm−1 |=ξ′′ prems(χ′).3 We take s′ to be the premise of r corresponding to χ, namely
s′ = (Γ[t/x], prems(χ′) B ∆[t/x]). Finally, we define ξ′ as follows:
ξ′ z=

ξ z if z appears free in Γ ∪ ∆
ξ′′ z if z appears free in prems(χ′)
anything otherwise
For all the cases, it is routine to check (when necessary with the help of Lemma 20) that
S ′ 6|=ξ′ s′ and descent (s, (S , ξ)) r (s′, (S ′, ξ′)). When checking the latter for r= psplit, we
rely on the following observations:
– For all M ∈marker ∩ Γ, we have JM[t/x]KSξ′ = JMKSξ .
– For all q (t) ∈marker ∩ prems(χ′), n is the smallest number such that Pq,n(JtKSξ′ ).
Corollary 28 Assume that, in the Genzten system of FOLind, a sequent Γ B ∆ either has
an iproof or has a cyclic proof and pointsTo fulfills Good Links. Then Γ B ∆ is satisfied by
all pairs (S , ξ), i.e.,S |=ξ Γ B ∆. Hence,S |= Γ B ∆.
Example 29 The infinite tree T of Figure 5 is an iproof, i.e., is well formed and satisfies
the goodness predicate. To see the latter, observe that the only infinite path in this tree is
σ= ((s1, r1) · (s2, r2) · (s3, r3))ω, where
– s1 = (even(x) B odd(Suc(x))), r1 = EVENsplit;
– s2 = (even(y) B odd(Suc(Suc(Suc(y))))), r2 = ODDSuc;
– s3 = (even(y) B odd(Suc(y))), r3 = SUBSTy,x.
If we let bs = (True ·False ·False)ω and Ms = (even(x) · even(y) · even(y))ω, we have that
follow bs Ms σ. Indeed, bs and Ms “follow” σ from the start, since
mark (s1, r1, s2) = {(even(x),True, even(y))}
mark (s2, r2, s3) = {(even(y), False, even(y))}
mark (s3, r3, s1) = {(even(y), False, even(x))}
Moreover, for the cyclic tree T ′ in Figure 4, taking pointsTo L to be T ′, we obtain that T ′ is
a well-formed cyclic proof and treeOf T ′ = T .
3 The definition of Pp,_ works with the original clauses χ ∈ indp, whereas here we apply it to the “copies”
χ′ of χ guaranteed to have their variables fresh for Γ and ∆, as stipulated in the psplit rule. This is unprob-
lematic, since it is easy to verify that the definition of Pp,_ is invariant under bijective renaming of variables
in the clauses χ.
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For accepting a cyclic or infinite proof in FOLind as a good (and hence valid) proof,
any infinite path should infinitely often apply the split rule to the (persistent) instance of the
same inductive predicate p.4 This can be seen from the fact that a triple (_,True, _), meaning
“decrease,” only appears in the definition of mark for the split rule. In the above example,
the predicate p that ensures goodness along the tree’s unique infinite path is even.
6.2 Other Instances
Variations of Gentzen systems for FOL, as discussed in Section 4.2, can in principle be
extended to FOLind, and the abstract infinite-proof soundness result would apply. Other
instances include extensions of modal logic with inductive definitions. In such logics, the
structures can be viewed as tuples S =
(
(Sw)w∈W , (Ff ,w) f ∈ fsym,w∈W , (Pp,w)p∈psym,w∈W
)
,
where W is a set of “worlds,” perhaps endowed with additional structure (algebraic, order-
theoretic, etc.). The inductiveness condition for predicates can be stated similarly to that of
FOLind, but can also spread across different worlds. (The split rule can be adapted accord-
ingly.)
Separation logic can be regarded as a variation of the above, where the structure carrier
Sw is fixed to some S and the worlds are heaps, i.e., partial functions from a fixed set of
locations to S. (In separation logic terminology, the worlds are the heaps, whereas the valu-
ations ξ are the stacks.) Two such instances are described by Brotherston et al. [16], one for
entailment [15] and one for termination proofs [14].
7 Formalization and Implementation
The definitions, lemmas, and theorems presented in Sections 3 and 5, pertaining to the pre-
sented abstract soundness and completeness results, have been formalized in the proof as-
sistant Isabelle/HOL. The instantiation step of Section 4.1 is formalized for a richer version
of FOL, with sorts and interpreted equality, as required by our motivating application (ef-
ficient encodings of sorts in unsorted FOL [7]). The formal development is publicly avail-
able [8, 10].
The necessary codatatypes and corecursive definitions are realized using a recently
introduced definitional package for (co)datatypes [6] with support for mutual and nested
(co)recursion [50] and mixed recursive–corecursive function definitions [11]. The tree co-
datatype illustrates the support for corecursion through permutative data structures (with
non-free constructors) such as finite sets, a feature that is not available in any other proof
assistant. The formalization is close to this article’s presentation, with a few differences
originating from Isabelle’s lack of support for dependent types.
For generating code, we make the additional assumption that the effect relation is deter-
ministic, and hence corresponds to a partial function eﬀ′ : rule→ sequent→ (sequent fset)
option, where the Isabelle datatype α option enriches a copy of αwith a special value None.5
From this function, we build the relational eﬀ as the partial function’s graph. Isabelle’s code
generator [25] can then produce Haskell code for the computable part of our completeness
proof—the abstract prover mkTree, defined corecursively in the proof of Theorem 15:
4 Goodness is decidable for cyclic trees in logics where rule application is decidable, such as FOLind [16].
5 In the proof system from Example 2, eﬀ is not deterministic due to the rule ALLR. It can be made
deterministic by refining the rule with a systematic choice of the fresh variable y.
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data Stream a = SCons a (Stream a)
newtype FSet a = FSet [a]
data Tree a = Node a (FSet (Tree a))
fmap f (FSet xs) = FSet (map f xs)
sdropWhile p (SCons a σ) =
if p a then sdropWhile p σ else SCons a σ
mkTree eff ρ s =
Node (s, r) (fmap (mkTree eff ρ’) (fromJust (eff r s)))
where SCons r ρ’ = sdropWhile (\r -> not (isJust (eff r s))) ρ
Finite sets are represented as lists. The functions isJust : α option→ bool and fromJust :
α option→ α are the Haskell-style discriminator and selector for option. Since the Isabelle
formalization is parametric over rule systems (sequent, rule, eﬀ), the code for mkTree explic-
itly takes eﬀ as a parameter.
Although Isabelle’s code generator was not designed with codatatypes in mind, it is
general enough to handle them. Internally, it reduces Isabelle specifications to higher-order
rewrite systems [35] and generates functional code in Haskell, OCaml, Scala, or Standard
ML. Partial correctness is guaranteed regardless of the target language’s evaluation strat-
egy. However, for the guarantee to be non-vacuous for corecursive definitions, one needs a
language with a lazy evaluation strategy, such as Haskell.
The verified contract of the program reads as follows: Given an available and persistent
rule system (sequent, rule, eﬀ), a fair rule enumeration ρ, and a sequent s representing the
formula to prove, mkTree eﬀ ρ s either yields a finite derivation tree of s or produces an
infinite fair derivation tree whose infinite paths are all countermodel paths. These guarantees
involve only partial correctness of ground term evaluation.
The generated code is a generic countermodel-producing semidecision procedure pa-
rameterized by the the proof system. Moreover, the fair rule enumeration parameter ρ can
be instantiated to various choices that may perform better than the simple scheme described
in Section 3. However, more research is needed to understand how our framework or a
refinement of it can accommodate state-of-the-art proof search procedures, such as conflict-
driven clause learning [5]. For example, one would rather want to specify ρ lazily (using
unification) during, and not before, the evaluation of mkTree.
8 Related Work
This article joins a series of pearls aimed at reclaiming mathematical concepts and results
for coinductive methods, including streams [43, 47], regular expressions [44, 46], and au-
tomata [45]. Some developments pass the ultimate test of formalization, usually in Agda
and Coq, the codatatype-aware proof assistants par excellence: the sieve of Eratosthenes [3],
real number basics [18], and temporal logic for red–blue trees [36].
So why write yet another formalized manifesto for coinduction and corecursion? First,
because we finally could—with the new codatatype package, Isabelle has caught up with its
rivals in this area, and has even superseded them in some respects; for example, the mixture
of recursion and corecusion allowed in function definitions is unique to Isabelle. Second,
because although codatatypes are a good match for the completeness and the infinite-proof
soundness theorems (as we hope to have shown), there seems to be no proof in the literature
that takes advantage of this.
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There are many accounts of the completeness theorem for FOL and related logics, in-
cluding Petria’s very abstract account [40] within institution-independent model theory [19].
However, most of these accounts favor the more mathematical Henkin style, which obfus-
cates the rich structure of proof and failure. This preference has a long history. It is positively
motivated by the ability to support uncountable languages. More crucially, it is negatively
motivated by the lack of rigor perceived in the alternative: “geometric” reasoning about
infinite trees. Negri [37] gives a revealing account in the context of modal logic, quoting
reviews that were favorable to Kripke’s completeness result [32] but critical of his informal
argument based on infinite tableau trees.6 Kaplan [30] remarks that “although the author
extracts a great deal of information from his tableau constructions, a completely rigorous
development along these lines would be extremely tedious.”
A few textbooks venture in a proof-theoretic presentation of completeness, notably Gal-
lier’s [22]. Such a treatment highlights not only the structure, but also the algorithmic content
of the proofs. The price is usually a lack of rigor, in particular a gap between the definition
of derivation trees and its use in the completeness argument. This lack of rigor should not be
taken lightly, as it may lead to serious ambiguities or errors: In the context of a tableau com-
pleteness proof development, Hähnle [26] first performs an implicit transition from finite
to possibly infinite tableaux, and then claims that tableau chain suprema exist by wrongly
invoking Zorn’s lemma [26, Definition 3.16].7
Orthogonally, we wanted to isolate and reuse the abstract core of the argument involv-
ing potentially infinite derivation trees and countermodel paths. Except for syntactic details,
the different accounts are after the same goal, and they reach it in a variety of more or
less colorful, if not noisy, ways; most of them do acknowledge that their approach is sim-
ilar to previous ones, but cannot refer to a given abstract result that addresses this goal.
Consequently, they have to repeat a variation of the same argument. For example, Gallier’s
monograph [22] repeats the argument four times, for logics of increasing complexity: propo-
sitional logic, FOL with no function symbols or equality, FOL with function symbols but no
equality, and finally full FOL; Bell and Machover [1] employ a different fair tree generation
strategy, to the same effect; for a world-instrumented system for modal logic, Negri [37]
employs yet another strategy.
Regrettably, one of the completeness results not covered by our abstract completeness is
connected to our other case study: logics admitting infinite proofs. Brotherston and Simpson
[17] show that completeness for FOLind (with equality) can be achieved by allowing infinite
proofs satisfying the Goodness condition from Section 5.1. This nonstandard completeness
result is not captured by our framework from Section 3, which requires finite proofs.
Unlike the infinite-proof soundness theorem (which represents a newer line of research),
the completeness theorem has been mechanized before in proof assistants. Schlöder and
Koepke, in Mizar [49], formalize a Henkin-style argument for possibly uncountable lan-
guages. Building on an early insight by Krivine [33] concerning the expressibility of the
completeness proof in intuitionistic second-order logic, Ilik [28] analyzes Henkin-style ar-
guments for classical and intuitionistic logic with respect to standard and Kripke models and
formalizes them in Coq (without employing codatatypes).
At least four proofs were developed using HOL-based systems. Harrison [27], in HOL
Light, and Berghofer [2], in Isabelle, opted for Henkin-style arguments. Berghofer’s work
was recently extended by Schlichtkrull [48] to prove the completeness of first-order reso-
6 And Kripke’s degree of rigor in this early article is not far from today’s state of the art in proof theory;
see, e.g., Troelstra and Schwichtenberg [51].
7 This is the only error we found in this otherwise excellent chapter on tableaux.
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lution. Ridge and Margetson [34, 42], also in Isabelle, employ proof trees constructed as
graphs of nodes that carry their levels as natural numbers. This last work has the merits of
analyzing the computational content of proofs in the style of Gallier [22] and discussing an
OCaml implementation. Our formalization relates to this work in a similar way to which our
presentation relates to Gallier’s: The newly introduced support for codatatypes and corecur-
sion in Isabelle provides suitable abstraction mechanisms for reasoning about infinite trees,
avoiding boilerplate for tree manipulation based on numeric indexing. Moreover, codata-
types are mapped naturally to Haskell types, allowing Isabelle’s code generator to produce
certified Haskell code. Finally, our proof is abstract and applies to a wide range of FOL
variants and beyond.
9 Conclusion
The completeness theorem is a fundamental result about classical logic. Its proof is pre-
sented in many variants in the literature. Few of these presentations emphasize the algorith-
mic content, and none of them uses codatatypes. Despite the variety of approaches proposed
in textbooks and formalizations, we found them lacking in rigor or readability. Gallier’s
pseudo-Pascal code is inspiring, but we prefer “pseudo-Haskell,” i.e., Isabelle/HOL with
codatatypes, to combine computational intuition and full mathematical rigor.
In our view, coinduction is the key to formulate an account that is both mathematically
rigorous and abundant in algorithmic content. This applies to both of our case studies: classic
completeness and infinite-proof soundness. The definition of the abstract prover mkTree is
stated rigorously, is accessible to functional programmers, and replaces pages of verbose
descriptions.
The advantages of machine-checked metatheory are well known from programming lan-
guage research, where new results are often formalized and proof assistants are used in the
classroom. This article reported on some steps we have taken to apply the same methods to
formal logic and automated reasoning.
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